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Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form 
AARON SAIGER 
Lawyers concerned with local government insist ubiquitously that 
their field is not administrative law. State administrative law, 
similarly, defines its subject to exclude local governments. 
Nevertheless, state agencies and local jurisdictions are functionally 
similar. Both are organized to afford state governments, which have 
broad scope and general jurisdiction, the benefits of specialization. 
This similarity is under-recognized. Recovering the deep similarities 
between local governments and state agencies is not only true to state 
constitutional design but can advance more productive and sensible 
approaches to various problems in local government and state 
administrative law. I support this final claim with a brief sketch of 
four exemplary problems: judicial review of claims that government 
has acted ultra vires, the extraterritorial reach of local government, 
the use of political information by agencies, and the design of 
specialized or hybrid institutions of state government. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Both local governments and state administrative agencies are 
specialist entities created by generalist state governments. States assign 
to both some limited portion of their plenary police power.1 This is done 
in the expectation that, compared to the state’s general-jurisdiction 
legislature, executives, and judiciary, the specialist institution will be 
more comprehensive in its understanding of its limited domain. It will 
be more expert in that domain’s circumstances, better attuned to its 
needs and requirements, and therefore more adept in its governance.  
The conceptual distinction between the state agency on one hand 
and the local government on the other is simply the dimension along 
which specialization occurs. Local governments exercise a portion of 
the general police power limned by geography. They are general-
purpose governments, but their jurisdiction extends only to Cleveland, 
or Franklin County, or New York City. State administrative agencies 
exercise the state’s power in a substantive area: education, or 
environmental protection, or motor vehicles. Their jurisdiction, 
generally statewide, is confined to a particular field. 
Given the shared characteristic of specialization, it is striking how 
discrete the constitutional and legal foundations of the two kinds of 
institutions are. Local governments and state agencies are distinct legal 
genuses. Local government law and state administrative law have 
different foundational doctrines, different requirements, and different 
restrictions. We teach about them in different courses and use different 
casebooks. Specialists in local government take pains to emphasize that 
                                                                                                                     
 1 For local governments, see Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of Nassau, 9 
N.E.3d 351, 359 (N.Y. 2014) (“Given that the authority of political subdivisions flows 
from the state government and is, in a sense, an exception to the state government’s 
otherwise plenary power, the lawmaking power of a county or other political subdivision 
‘can be exercised only to the extent it has been delegated by the State.’”) (quoting Albany 
Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 379 (1989)); Geauga Cty. 
Bd. of Comm’rs v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel, 621 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ohio 1993) (Ohio 
counties, which unlike Ohio municipalities lack home rule, may only act pursuant to a 
“specific statutory grant of authority”). For state agencies, see City of New York v. State of 
New York Comm’n on Cable Television, 390 N.E.2d 293, 295 (N.Y. 1979) (“An 
administrative agency, as a creature of the Legislature, is clothed with those powers 
expressly conferred by its authorizing statute, as well as those required by necessary 
implication.” (citations omitted)); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 417 (Ohio 2000) (per curiam) (“An administrative agency 
has no authority beyond the authority conferred by statute and it may exercise only those 
powers that are expressly granted by the General Assembly.”).  
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their field “is not administrative law.”2 State administrative lawyers 
similarly reject the possibility that local governments might fall within 
their purview.3 If the latter group is interested at all in matters local, its 
interest is in local agencies.4 
State agencies and local governments are different, as I explain in 
Part II. But, I argue in Part III, the gap between them is no chasm. It is 
functionally more precise, doctrinally more accurate, and civically more 
productive to think of the two forms as points along a spectrum that 
ranges from pure sovereignty to pure agency. Doing so reveals the 
analogy between local governments and state agencies to be a strong 
one, which should be relied upon in thinking about both. That analogy 
is descriptively and prescriptively superior to analogies between state 
and federal agencies on one hand and between local and state 
governments on the other.  
Part IV sketches some ways in which the agency/locality analogy 
can help to address some perennial problems that face both local 
government law and state administrative law. For example, courts 
reviewing claims that government has acted ultra vires construe 
ambiguity in statutory delegations to agencies fairly liberally, but 
(outside the home rule context) read similarly ambiguous delegations to 
localities narrowly, to limit local power. I suggest that in both areas a 
middle ground, closer to that of administrative law, might be more 
desirable.5 The similarities of agencies to local governments also 
suggest innovative approaches to the perennial problem in local 
government law of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the extraterritorial 
franchise.6 Local government law principles, in turn, offer useful 
models for administrative law with respect to the use of political 
information by agencies and the design of specialized or hybrid 
                                                                                                                     
 2 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 9 (7th ed. 2009); accord David J. Barron, The Promise of 
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 563–64 (1999) 
(“A local community is not simply a type of state administrative agency to be shaped at 
will to serve the need of the central state.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and 
Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 690 (2001) (resisting the idea that “local governments 
are no more nor less than creatures of the state government, analogous therefore to 
administrative sub-units of government”). 
 3 See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 4 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017); Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and 
the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1864–65 (2013). 
 5 See infra Part IV.A. 
 6 See infra Part IV.B. 
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institutions of state government.7 
II. SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS AGENCY 
The regnant view is that local government law and state 
administrative law have little to say to one another. The two forms are 
animated by different theories of government. Local governments are in 
some sense sovereigns distinct from the state, giving expression to a 
local, popular will. Agencies, by contrast, are agents of the state, 
deploying expertise and resources to advance its aims.  
Lawyers, along with political scientists, philosophers, and 
historians, often see in the locality the first and perhaps conceptually 
cleanest polis or demos.8 The sovereignty of local government is primal. 
States and nations are built on the foundation of local governments; 
large republics are built on the foundation of many local democracies.9 
Moreover, localities enjoy a particularly strong form of political 
legitimacy because its citizens choose, fairly directly, to subject 
themselves to its authority. The numerous and fairly small local 
governments of the United States roughly approximate a Tieboutian 
world in which citizens select a locality based upon their preferences 
across diverse competing jurisdictions, each offering different bundles 
of local public goods and taxes.10 
In the United States, locality and sovereignty are also associated 
historically. American local government precedes state government in 
time.11 It begins as an institution that exercises fundamentally private 
power, as the municipal corporation.12 This private power was then 
reconceptualized as public, local sovereignty.13 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See infra Part IV.C–D. 
 8 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the 
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 340 (1994) 
(“[L]ocalism tends to enhance a community’s self-determination in the initial making of 
policy . . . .”); Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 
896 & n.61 (2006) (citing de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill).  
 9 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Marshfield, Models of Subnational Constitutionalism, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1151, 1169 (2011). 
 10 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956); Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 94 
(2009). 
 11 See, e.g., Jared Eigerman, California Counties: Second-Rate Localities or Ready-
Made Regional Governments?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 621, 628 (1999) (“The county 
concept predates California statehood.”). 
 12 GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS 36–39 (1999). 
 13 See id. at 39–45. 
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The political and historical associations of locality and sovereignty 
survive even as state constitutional law has come to understand local 
sovereignty in most places as an expression of the state’s plenary power 
to advance the public good. As a formal matter, local power generally 
exists only insofar as it is delegated to the locality by the state 
legislature. Local governments under this theory are “creatures of the 
state.”14 Only in a relatively small number of municipalities was local 
sovereignty preserved under the constitutional institution of home 
rule.15 But even home rule jurisdictions are far from exercising general 
police powers. Both state constitutions and especially state legislatures 
routinely limit the extent of home-rule authority.16 
For theoretical, historical, and doctrinal reasons, therefore, those 
who think about American local government law generally focus upon 
issues related to sovereignty and democratic legitimacy, such as self-
determination, the franchise, representation, democratic participation, 
and bottom-up governance.  
This set of concerns overlaps only modestly with that of the 
administrative lawyer working at the state level. State agencies, unlike 
local governments, have no sovereignty at all. They lack any prior claim 
to authority or jurisdiction. They are understood to be the province of 
bureaucrats and technocrats. They are without cavil not just creatures of 
the state but agents of the state. And these two things are different. 
Local governments, though created by the state, are expected while they 
exist to pursue local interests. Agencies, as agents, should strictly 
pursue state interests. 
Citizens do not choose to be subject to the authority of state 
agencies in anywhere near as active a sense in which they choose a 
locality. And, historically, agency power is a late development. The 
bureaucratization of state government, like the bureaucratization of the 
federal government, has its early roots in the Progressive Era’s devotion 
to expertise and quickly accelerated only in or after the New Deal 
period.  
The state administrative lawyer, therefore, has been concerned only 
marginally with sovereignty, voting, and representation. Administrative 
                                                                                                                     
 14 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2280–81 
(2003). 
 15 See id. at 2289–90. 
 16 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1125–26 (2007) 
(distinguishing between “imperio” home rule, which limits the home-rule jurisdiction to 
“local” matters—and relies upon state courts to define what is “local”—and “legislative 
home rule,” in which states determine by statute what authority is devolved to the home-
rule locality and what is retained at the state level).  
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lawyers are surely interested in participation, governance, and, 
especially, democratic legitimacy.17 But such lawyers’ context for 
thinking about these issues is broader than the franchise and 
representativeness. That context is shaped by concerns mostly foreign to 
the local-government theorist: concerns about procedural adequacy, 
notice, and the roles of rationality and expertise. 
That gulf between the two areas is reinforced, moreover, by the way 
in which the constitutional and conceptual development of both local 
government law and state administrative law have rested upon analogies 
to their federal counterparts. The analogy between federal and state 
agencies is strong indeed. Administrative law is a preeminent example 
of “lockstep” jurisprudence.18 Not only has judicial development of 
state administrative law (over)depended upon analogous federal law 
decisions, but legislative design of state administrative procedure has 
relied heavily as well upon the federal Administrative Procedure Act.  
The parallel analogy with respect to local government law, between 
national–state federalism and state–local relations, has also been deeply 
influential among both lawyers and political scientists.19 Although local 
government law systematically acknowledges the ways in which the 
two varieties of intergovernmental relations differ, a shared concept of 
dual sovereignty dominates its discourse. States are sovereign, within 
the sovereign nation; at least a substantial subset of localities, not 
limited to home-rule jurisdictions, are sovereign in some important 
sense within the larger sovereign state.20 This kind of thinking about 
local government treats it as federalism writ small, albeit with attention 
to differences as well as similarities with the national relationship that is 
American federalism. 
The dichotomy between sovereignty and agency, buttressed by 
doctrinal and institutional parallels to the practices of national and 
federal government in the United States, has meant that local 
                                                                                                                     
 17 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992) (understanding 
administrative law as seeking a form of “civic republicanism”). 
 18 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Introduction, State Constitutions in the United States Federal 
System, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 202 (2016); Robert F. Williams, Foreword, Justice William 
J. Brennan, Jr. and the Evolving Development of State Constitutional Law, 77 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 203, 209–10 (2016). 
 19 See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 66–76 (1981) (for a political science 
perspective). 
 20 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 8 (2010). 
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governments and state agencies evolved as distinct legal silos.21 Most 
lawyers think that local governments are chalk and state agencies 
cheese. 
                                                                                                                     
 21 The insistence of expositors of local government law that their subject is different 
from state administrative law has already been noted. See supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. It is fair to say that administrative law endorses this dichotomy with equal heartiness, 
although some confusion has been introduced by a 2010 change in the language of the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) with respect to this issue. The 1981 
MSAPA clearly defined “[a]gency” to mean any “administrative unit of this State” but 
specifically excepted “a political subdivision of the state or any of the administrative units 
of a political subdivision.” MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(1) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 1981). The 2010 revisions define the 
same term to mean “a state board, authority, commission, institution, department, division, 
office, officer, or other state entity that is authorized by law of this state to make rules or to 
adjudicate” with specific exemptions only for the “the Governor, the [Legislature], [and] 
the Judiciary.” REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(3) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010) [hereinafter 2010 MSAPA] 
(first alteration in original). The Uniform Law Reporters’ comment to this definition, 
moreover, avers that “the definition applies only to state actors, not local agencies.” Id. § 1-
102 cmt. at 11. 
As a textual matter, this change could be read to suggest that local governments are 
state agencies. An explicit definitional exclusion of local governments from the category of 
state agencies was removed. And the replacement definition seems almost determined to 
leave a window open for understanding local governments as agencies. This is further 
buttressed by the comment. Moreover, localities are “state actors” under both federal and 
state law. E.g., Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (“The actions of local 
government are the actions of the State.”). And local governments are not local “agencies,” 
by definition. Rather, they are local principals.  
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the change in the MSAPA is meant to suggest that 
local governments could fall under the terms of the act. The sense of the reporters’ 
comment, notwithstanding its semantic meaning, is that localities are excluded from the 
definition of agency. I find no evidence that the 2010 drafters sought to alter the common 
state practice of defining agencies to exclude local governments. 
Indeed, this exclusion is explicit in administrative procedure statutes in thirteen states. 
See ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“The term [‘agency’] shall not 
include . . . counties, municipalities, or any agencies of local governmental units.”); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-901(1) (2016) (“[A]dministrative agency or agency does not 
include . . . any political subdivision or municipal corporation or any agency of a political 
subdivision or municipal corporation.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10102(1) (2003) 
(“Agency . . . does not include . . . municipalities, counties, school districts, . . . and other 
political subdivisions, joint state-federal, interstate or intermunicipal authorities and their 
agencies.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(1) (West 2013) (“‘Agency’ . . . does not include a 
municipality or legal entity created solely by a municipality . . . or a legal or administrative 
entity created by an interlocal agreement . . . .”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/1-20 (West 
2013) (“‘Agency’ means each officer, board, commission, and agency created by the 
Constitution, whether in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of State 
government, . . . other than units of local government . . . .”); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-1-3 
(West 2015) (defining “[a]gency” to exclude “a political subdivision”); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 17A.2(1) (West 2010) (“‘Agency’ does not mean . . . a political subdivision of the state 
or its offices and units.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(2) (2010) (“‘Agency’ means each state 
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III. BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FORMS 
Localities and state agencies are distinct institutions. Local 
governments have specific obligations and powers, constitutional and 
statutory, different from those of administrative agencies. There is no 
confusing the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 
doubtless an agency, with a local government. Nor can there be any 
doubt that Columbus (where the main office of the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction is located) is not an agency but a political 
subdivision of Ohio. 
But although the two institutions are distinct, their designs, 
missions, and structures overlap. In light of state constitutional 
categories, they are much more similar than they first appear.22 They are 
certainly more similar than their counterparts one level up, states and 
federal agencies, are to one another. This Part outlines these similarities. 
                                                                                                                     
board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity which makes rules, 
regulations, or policy . . . except . . . any political subdivision . . . and any board, 
commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity thereof . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 8002(2) (2013) (“‘Agency’ . . . does not include . . . school administrative 
units, . . . special purpose districts or municipalities, counties or other political subdivisions 
of the State.”); MINN. STAT. § 14.02(2) (2015) (“‘Agency’ means any state officer, board, 
commission, bureau, division, department, or tribunal, other than a judicial branch court 
and the Tax Court, having a statewide jurisdiction . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(1a) 
(2013) (“A local unit of government is not an agency.”); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 745.3 (West 2015) (explicitly excluding from the definition of “agency” “any court, 
political subdivision, municipal or local authority”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-102(2) 
(LexisNexis 2014) (explicitly excluding from the definition of “agency” “the political 
subdivisions of the state”); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166 (West Supp. 2016) 
(defining “[a]gency” to exclude “town or regional boards of education”); MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV’T § 10-202 (LexisNexis 2014) (defining “[a]gency” as a “unit that: (i) is 
created by general law; (ii) operates in at least 2 counties”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1 
(2012) (defining “[a]gency” to include “a home-rule municipality that has adopted its own 
administrative appeals process, whose final decisions, rulings, or actions rendered by that 
process are subject to judicial review” but otherwise to exclude “any unit of local 
government”). Most remaining states, tracking to a greater or lesser degree the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, define “agency” in a way that uses the term “state” and lend 
themselves to being read as excluding localities, although they do not say so explicitly. 
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.330(a), 44.62.640(b) (2014). But see CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 6252 (West 2008) (defining “[p]ublic agency” to include any “local agency,” which is in 
turn defined to include “a county; city, whether general law or chartered; city and county; 
school district; municipal corporation; district; political subdivision; or any board, 
commission or agency thereof”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1(1) (West 2008) 
(“‘Agency’ means each state or county board, commission, department, or officer 
authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 22 Cf. Gerken, supra note 20, at 29 (all decentralized sites of governance have 
similarities as well as differences). 
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The next Part suggests various ways in which these similarities should 
inform the legal treatment of each. 
A. Delegation 
Most essentially, local governments and state agencies are each 
specialist organizations that exercise delegated power in their special 
areas. The State of Ohio delegates its power to govern the part of its 
territory called “Columbus” to the government of Columbus. That 
government’s charge can fairly be described as the power to operate 
Columbus governmental institutions and make Columbus policy. In a 
very similar sense, a classic state agency like the Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction is empowered by the State of Ohio to 
operate its prisons and make correctional policy. 
In this sense it is accurate to describe local governments, although 
sovereign, also as “agents” of the state, like agencies proper. Yishai 
Blank describes this duality well: 
The tension between the bureaucratic and the democratic conception of 
localities marks not only the field of local government law, but the nature of 
the city as a legal concept. In many domestic jurisdictions, the attitude 
towards localities reflects the same ambivalence: On the one hand, the 
bureaucratic conception envisions localities as an integral part of the state, an 
administrative convenience, or a local branch of the central national 
government; and on the other hand, the democratic conception understands 
local governments to be independent and autonomous corporations, reflecting 
the will of a local community, a semi-sovereign democratic entity distinct 
from and independent of the state.23 
The state delegates power to agencies and localities alike.24 
                                                                                                                     
 23 Blank, supra note 8, at 894–95 (footnotes omitted); see also Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are . . . created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be 
entrusted to them.”); BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 70 (characterizing various 
cases as reflecting a view of “Local Government as Agent of the State”). 
 24 One area where this equivalence has been rejected is the Supreme Court’s 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The Court extends state sovereign immunity to its 
agencies but not its localities:  
[T]he Eleventh Amendment shields an entity from suit in federal court only when it is 
so closely tied to the State as to be the direct means by which the State acts, for 
instance a state agency. In contrast, when a State creates subdivisions and imbues 
them with a significant measure of autonomy, such as the ability to levy taxes, issue 
bonds, or own land in their own name, these subdivisions are too separate from the 
State to be considered its “arms.” This is so even though these political subdivisions 
exist solely at the whim and behest of their State. 
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The necessity and legitimacy of such delegations get extensive 
treatment both in local government law and in administrative law. In 
local government law, the principle that local power is delegated power 
is the organizing concept of the creatures-of-the-state theory of local 
government associated with the nineteenth century figure of John 
Dillon. Gerald Frug quotes Dillon’s 1872 exposition of the expansive 
nature of state power over localities: It “is supreme and transcendent: it 
may erect, change, divide, and even abolish, at pleasure, as it deems the 
public good to require.”25 Local power is entirely derivative of the state 
decision to delegate. Dillon calls the contingent and delegated nature of 
local power a principle of “foundation[al]” importance.26 
Dillon’s approach is widely understood to be the dominant approach 
to local power today, even by those scholars who uncover and highlight 
a competing tradition of core local sovereignty inoculated against some 
state encroachments. Even such scholars recognize the general power of 
states qua states to “erect, change, divide, and even abolish” local 
governments. To the extent that states have ratified constitutions that 
provide for home rule or for other, indestructible forms of local 
sovereignty, this is a design choice that departs from the norm.  
At the same time, the creature of the state theory is a formal one. In 
practice, what might be called the political safeguards of state–local 
relations protect local power, even when state authority is expansively 
understood.27 The states of New York and Ohio are not about to abolish 
Columbus or New York City anytime soon. There are rare cases of 
forced consolidation or substitute administration, where states exercise 
their power to destroy. As discussed below,28 these bring with them 
enormous controversy; they are exceptions that prove the rule. 
                                                                                                                     
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 313 (1990) (quoting Graham v. 
Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 252 (1906)). This distinction rests in part upon the content of state 
statutory definitions, like those listed supra note 21, that define localities as “entities” 
distinct from the state itself. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Some scholars read this doctrine to demand a fairly bright line 
between the agency and local-government forms. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, 
Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1426 & n.271 (2012). 
 25 FRUG, supra note 12, at 45–50. 
 26 JOHN F. DILLON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 237(89) (5th ed. 1911), (quoted in GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (6th ed. 2015)). The canonical statement of the parallel 
doctrine in federal law is Hunter, 207 U.S. at 161. 
 27 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and 
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1345 (2009). 
 28 See infra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
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Whatever controversy still surrounds the idea of delegation in local 
government law, there is none in state administrative law. There, the 
principle of delegation goes without saying: agencies have no power 
absent a delegation from the state. As with local governments, the 
baseline presumption is that states may erect, change, divide, empower, 
and abolish agencies as they see fit. At the same time, also like local 
governments, agencies whose power is formally entirely contingent 
nevertheless often enjoy a political status that guarantees them 
substantial practical autonomy. And, again like local governments, there 
also exist formal exceptions to the principle that agencies’ power is 
dependent upon state acquiescence. The presumption of agency 
contingency can be overcome. When a state constitution directs that a 
particular agency be created or sets out its authority, general state 
government is bound by these directives. Many agencies enjoy such 
independent constitutional authority.29  
Frug’s treatment of Dillon’s thinking emphasizes that the parallel 
between the centrality of delegation in local government and 
administrative law is no coincidence. Frug argues that Dillon should be 
seen “as a forerunner of the Progressive tradition: he sought to protect 
private property not only against abuse by democracy but also against 
abuse by private economic power. To do so, he advocated an objective, 
rational government, staffed by the nation’s elite . . . .”30 Dillon also 
insisted upon a robust and stringent role for courts in insuring that 
localities did not exceed their proper bounds. These same principles are 
familiar to any student of administrative law. It was upon a foundation 
of Progressivism that modern administrative power was established and 
continues to be legitimated. 
In practice, attention to the scope of delegations to localities has 
meant that local governments are specialist organizations not only as to 
geographical reach but as to substantive scope as well. Numerous issues 
of local concern are outside of the usual grant of power to local 
government. Many general local governments effectively control only 
issues of land use and direct municipal services.31  
                                                                                                                     
 29 See N.Y. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (providing for state departments “of audit and control,” 
law, education, and “agriculture and markets”); OHIO CONST. art. 6, § 4 (establishing state 
board of education and requiring appointment of a superintendent of public instruction); id. 
art. 14, § 1(A) (creating Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board “for the purpose of 
establishing standards governing the care and well-being of livestock and poultry in this 
state”). 
 30 FRUG, supra note 12, at 46. 
 31 J. ERIC OLIVER ET AL., LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL-SCALE 
DEMOCRACY 24 (2012). 
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B. Popular Vote Versus Appointment 
One potential rebuttal to the claim of similarity is to emphasize the 
distinction between sovereignty and technocratic expertise developed in 
Part II. Local governments may be created by the state, but they are 
founded in a local franchise. By contrast, appointed officials run 
agencies and are supposed to govern them in light of their expertise. 
Agency governance is not based upon voting or the aggregation of 
popular sentiment, except in the attenuated sense that appointment is 
carried out by popularly elected, general-government officials.  
This distinction would be fairly convincing were one comparing 
federal agencies to state government. But it is unpersuasive in the state–
local context. In many states, both major and minor state agencies are 
elected rather than appointed. At the same time, local governments 
sometimes dispense with the franchise, allowing technocratic or elite 
governance to replace popular politics in whole or part. 
The practice of electing agency heads is well-established in the 
states. It is not just that states have plural executives, though they do 
(which has implications for various administrative law doctrines that 
were developed at the federal level and therefore assume a unitary 
executive). Laying aside the independent election of governors and 
lieutenant governors, Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen have 
documented the apparent trend in the states towards what they call 
executive “unbundling.”32 More than three-quarters of the states (in 
their 2002 survey) elected attorneys general, treasurers, and secretaries 
of state independently of the state’s general executive.33 Berry and 
Gersen identified a dozen or more states that also directly elect 
commissioners or secretaries in charge of insurance, agriculture, 
education, and fiscal management, and substantial numbers of other 
state agencies whose leaders stand for periodic election.34 More 
idiosyncratic agencies are also subject to election.35 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1385, 1399–1401 (2008). Plural executives with specific “agency” responsibilities are 
also common at the county level. George W. Liebmann, The New American Local 
Government, 34 URB. LAW. 93, 100 (2002). 
 33 Berry & Gersen, supra note 32, at 1433 tbl.4. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–99 (2000) (election of nine trustees of the 
“state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs,” per HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5). 
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Texas offers an extreme example of this trend.36 The only major 
executive officer appointed by the Governor is the Secretary of State. 
Otherwise, all major executive officials—the Lieutenant Governor, 
Attorney General, Comptroller of Public Accounts, Commissioner of 
the Land Office, and the multi-member Railroad Commission and State 
Board of Education—are subject to direct election.37 Nor do these 
officials run as a slate.38 The Governor does control appointments to 
lead many state agencies, but most of these are small and of limited 
impact; he uses these appointments as a source of patronage.39 
The converse holds as well. Arrangements for institutional 
leadership reminiscent of agencies are ubiquitous in the practice of local 
government. David Barron has demonstrated that the home-rule 
movement itself was founded upon an “administrative” view of local 
government.40 Home-rule proponents sought a city “run by principles of 
expertise and efficiency rather than by the crass practices of partisan 
politics” and emphasized “the apolitical and administrative character of 
local matters—properly understood.”41 This is reflected, for example, in 
the institution of the city manager, a role traditionally understood to call 
for a “neutral expert[]” at some remove from politics.42 This is the 
Progressive model for the head of an administrative agency. 
Similarly, contemporary counties generally are managed by plural 
boards rather than single executives.43 Multiple-member boards are 
common in agencies but relatively rare in other governments. County 
boards, moreover, often operate with simultaneous legislative and 
executive authority.44 In this respect, they are also similar to agencies, 
which, unlike other popularly elected governments in America routinely 
                                                                                                                     
 36 UNIV. OF TEX., TEXAS POLITICS: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH § 9, 
http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/exec/0900.html [https://perma.cc/QFK6-46NA]. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. § 9.10. 
 40 See Barron, supra note 14, at 2300. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Richard J. Stillman II, The City Manager: Professional Helping Hand, or 
Political Hired Hand?, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT: CURRENT ISSUES AND BEST 
PRACTICES 12, 14, 18–19 & n.16 (Douglas J. Watson & Wendy L. Hassett eds., 2003) (but 
also noting contemporary scholarship recognizing the many political dimensions of city 
managers’ roles). 
 43 See Liebmann, supra note 32, at 99–100. 
 44 DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 19 (6th ed. 2006); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote 
and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 348–49 (1993). 
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exercise simultaneous executive and quasi-legislative power.45 These 
similarities are sufficiently strong to tempt some to conceptualize 
counties in particular as resembling state agencies more closely than 
general-purpose local governments.46 
Recently, efforts to detach local government from local voting in 
distressed localities have become particularly visible. Michelle Wilde 
Anderson has called attention to the phenomenon of “municipal 
dissolution,” whereby cities “indefinitely remove a layer of municipal 
government and return a population to unincorporated county or 
township jurisdiction.”47 If one accepts the suggestion that counties are 
analogues of state agencies, dissolutions are choices to shift institutional 
form from that of classic local government towards that of agencies. 
Similarly challenging to local democracy is the practice, still 
unusual but becoming both more ubiquitous and more controversial, of 
state governments placing general local governments and school 
districts under emergency management or into financial or general 
receivership.48 Such arrangements supplant the powers and sometimes 
the offices of elected local officials, supplanting or replacing them with 
officials appointed by the state. It is difficult indeed to determine 
whether a local government in receivership is best categorized as a local 
government or whether it has become a state agency. On the one hand, 
the local form persists. A locality, though partially or entirely in the 
hands of its receiver, retains its substantive mandate, its powers, its 
duties to its citizens, and its borders.49 On the other hand, the 
democratic institutions of the locality are dissolved, and the appointed 
receiver is responsive to state, not local, officers and constituencies.50 
Localities under receivership easily fall within the definition of the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act definition of “agency” as “a 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of 
“Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2004). 
 46 See Anderson, supra note 24, at 1426. 
 47 See id. at 1367. 
 48 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in 
State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 584 (2012); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373, 1447 (2014); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 
121 YALE L.J. 860, 881 (2012); Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local School Districts 
as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 1848–89 (1999); Julie 
Bosman & Monica Davey, Anger in Michigan Over Appointing Emergency Managers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/us/anger-in-michigan-
over-appointing-emergency-managers.html [https://perma.cc/M7HS-CACY]. 
 49 See Anderson, supra note 48, at 600. 
 50 Id. at 585, 600, 602. 
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state board, authority, commission, institution, department, division, 
office, officer, or other state entity that is authorized by law of this state 
to make rules or to adjudicate.”51 
The identity of local receivers and replacement officials with 
agencies is not merely formalistic. Clayton Gillette observes that a 
substitute administration, put in place by the state to supplant local 
officers, owes duties to and in fact represents nonresidents: creditors to 
be sure, but more generally the entire state polity.52 This is similar 
indeed to the structure of representation we associate with agencies: 
although those concerned with the regulated industry or subject matter 
attach special importance to the work of the agency, and may enjoy 
special access to its decision-making process, the agency is an organ of 
an undivided state polity, open to its comments, and expected to pursue 
its broad public interest. 
C. Special Local Government as an Intermediate Form 
The difficulty of deciding whether localities subject to state 
receivership remain local governments or are better thought of as 
agencies demonstrates vividly that the two forms lie along a kind of 
spectrum. That spectrum includes many intermediate cases. One set of 
these are the special districts. The precise institutional limits of the 
special district are difficult to define, although its exemplary members 
are clear. Special district are “autonomous local governments that 
provide a single or limited services.”53 The jurisdiction of special 
districts, like that of local governments, is thus limited to their local 
borders. But they are special purpose, with jurisdiction limited to a 
particular subject matter, such as drainage, sewage, water quality, or 
electricity.  
School districts are a distinct, intermediate form. They are like 
special districts in the sense that they are both local and have limited 
substantive jurisdiction. But, unlike special districts, every location is 
part of some school district. School districts are ubiquitous and 
politically salient in a way most special districts are not.54 
                                                                                                                     
 51 2010 MSAPA, supra note 21, § 1-102(3) (the Model Act provides specific 
exclusions only for “the Governor, the [Legislature], or the Judiciary” (alteration in 
original)). 
 52 See Gillette, supra note 48, at 1383, 1401. 
 53 KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE 
GOVERNMENT 2 (1997). 
 54 See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 
502 (2010). 
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Special districts and school districts both elide by definition the 
standard distinction between local sovereign and state agency: they 
specialize both by location and by purpose. As the special district’s 
purpose narrows, or the local boundaries grow relative to the size of the 
state, the special district becomes more and more similar to an agency. 
As its substantive mandate grows and its borders shrink, it seems more 
like a local government. The similarities are especially striking when 
one considers that many state agencies, such as those concerned with 
economic development,55 the environment,56 and transportation,57 are 
organized into regions, and therefore also have simultaneous geographic 
and substantive specializations.58 
Kathryn Foster’s canonical treatment of special districts emphasizes 
their “independence” from their “parent government”—but Foster 
means by this independence from the locality’s general government, not 
from the state. Similarly, she says, a special district has 
“[a]dministrative independence” from a parent government if it either 
has elections or is led by appointed officials who perform “distinct” 
functions. She also emphasizes factors such as “perpetual succession.”59 
What she is describing sounds in every respect like an administrative 
agency.  
The intermediate nature of the special district can be obscured 
because those who study it understand and categorize it as a type of 
local government. But it is not subject to local government law across 
the board. The most glaring exemption is with respect to the franchise. 
The federal courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to 
require one person, one vote in elections for general local 
                                                                                                                     
 55 See, e.g., Regional Overviews, N.Y. EMPIRE ST. DEV., http://www.esd.ny.gov/ 
RegionalOverviews.html [https://perma.cc/AHU6-GDAL] (ten regions in New York 
Empire State Development Agency). 
 56 See, e.g., DEC Regional Office Directory, N.Y. ST. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/558.html [https://perma.cc/DA45-HGQD] (nine regions in 
New York Department of Environmental Conservation); District Offices, OHIO ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.state.oh.us/districts.aspx [https://perma.cc/UC5G-T2VW] 
(five regions in Ohio Environmental Protection Agency). 
 57 See, e.g., Regional Offices & Counties, N.Y. ST. DEP’T TRANSP., 
https://www.dot.ny.gov/regional-offices [https://perma.cc/7WJB-3PN8] (eleven districts in 
New York State Department of Transportation). 
 58 Some important federal agencies also share this feature. See Dave Owen, Regional 
Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 61–62 (2016); About EPA, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa [https://perma.cc/9GKG-2JKW] (ten 
regions in the United States Environmental Protection Agency, each with a regional 
administrator and deputy regional administrator). 
 59 FOSTER, supra note 53, at 10. 
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governments.60 But, as Richard Briffault has emphasized, the 
requirement that elected local offices obey the one-person-one-vote rule 
is limited to those local governments that, under a hazy standard 
imperfectly articulated by the Supreme Court, are “general purpose 
governments.”61 It is unclear how general a government must be to 
qualify; the Court, without apparent difficulty, has extended the one-
person-one-vote rule to local school districts, for example.62 
Nevertheless, many special districts are clearly exempt.  
If a special district is sufficiently special, in other words, it sheds its 
duty to be representative and instead is directed to behave with special 
solicitude towards the needs and desires of its regulated population. 
Precisely this sort of special relationship between regulator and 
regulated is not just standard operating procedure for many agencies but 
an intentional design feature for more than a few. Agencies are not 
intended to be captured by those whom it regulates—although they 
often are. But they are designed in the expectation that they will be 
regularly connected and intertwined with regulated entities, so that they 
can understand their practices, appreciate their problems, and 
communicate with them.  
The Court further notes the possibility that special district officials 
could be appointed and not elected at all. “[T]here might be some case 
in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties as so far 
removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately 
affect different groups that a popular election . . . might not be 
required.”63 This would make special districts even more like agencies. 
And, indeed, most nontaxing special districts today are designed in this 
way, with “appointed boards with members selected by the chief 
executive or legislative body of the parent government.”64  
D. Powers 
The paradigmatic powers of an agency are rulemaking and 
adjudication. Cognate processes are also core characteristics of local 
government: the passage of local ordinances and the hearing of cases by 
                                                                                                                     
 60 Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). 
 61 Briffault, supra note 44, at 360. 
 62 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969). 
 63 Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) (cited in 
Briffault, supra note 44, at 357). 
 64 FOSTER, supra note 53, at 12. 
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local courts.65 This is just to say that both are governmental institutions 
with the power to bind citizens to duties and adjudicate their rights. The 
overlap is particularly striking given the contemporary activism of cities 
in areas that one might once have expected to be fully in the purview of 
state or even federal agencies. Broadband regulation66 and public 
health67 are just two among many examples. 
The converse comparison is somewhat more complex. Nadav 
Shoked has argued that there are institutions, other than the franchise, 
that are at the core of sovereignty and therefore peculiarly associated 
with entities that are local governments.68 These include the levying of 
taxes, the issuance of debt, and the use of eminent domain.69 These 
distinctions are far from clean, however. Although they may reflect the 
weight of ordinary practice in each sector, they do not reflect formal 
powers. Both general and special local governments levy all manner of 
fees and charges as well as taxes.70 Regulatory fees are as old as 
regulation71 and many agencies levy user fees, though not taxes, 
ubiquitously.72 The distinction between taxes and fees can be a fine 
one.73 Eminent domain is similarly ubiquitously exercised across the 
spectrum of institutional forms: by agencies, both federal and state; by 
local governments, both general and special-purpose; and in some 
states, by certain private entities.74  
Only with respect to the issuance of debt do governments operate 
differently than agencies. A local government, whether special or 
general, can issue special bonds, but agencies relying on income not 
generated through fees are generally funded through their parent 
government’s budget, which may or may not rely upon debt as 
circumstances vary. However, public–private entities up to and 
                                                                                                                     
 65 See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 904 
(2013). 
 66 See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 796, 836 (2012). 
 67 See Diller, supra note 4, at 1862–67. 
 68 Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2013). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” 
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 379–81 (2004). 
 71 Id. at 408 & n.174. 
 72 See 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (2012) (“The head of each agency . . . may prescribe 
regulations establishing the charge for a service or thing of value provided by the 
agency.”). 
 73 E.g., Cynthia B. Faulhaber, Government Law, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1023, 1028 n.31 
(1997) (cataloguing Michigan cases resolving disputes over whether charges were taxes or 
fees); Reynolds, supra note 70, at 409–15. 
 74 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005); Alexandra B. 
Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 693 (2008). 
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including quasi-governmental organizations, which are in some 
important senses agencies, can and do issue their own debt.75 
E. Constitutional Generality 
State constitutions clearly anticipate the existence of both local 
governments and state agencies. But they are fairly nondirective 
regarding how these forms are to operate. They give government 
substantial freedom to design both state agencies and local government 
to suit their need for specialization.  
With respect to agencies, except for those agencies who are elected, 
state constitutions are largely (but not completely) silent as to questions 
about whether and how.76 This is not true of local governments; state 
constitutions do more often than not provide for municipal home rule, 
which typically allocates to specified cities a zone of action free of state 
interference.77 But the ability to create and rearrange cities persists, and 
home rule still allows states plenty of room to tailor municipal powers.78 
Certainly states have more freedom to adjust those powers than the 
federal government has to pre-empt state action or commandeer its 
officials. 
In short, local governments and state agencies are much more 
similar than generally acknowledged. Both depend on delegation. Both 
specialize, geographically and substantively. Both are accountable but 
can also be removed from politics. Both are blurry about the franchise. 
Both impact some people directly and others indirectly. Both can 
benefit from decision-making that is at some remove from politics. 
States have substantial freedom of institutional design with respect to 
both. 
Moreover, these similarities show a pitfall of over-reliance upon a 
fractal theory of federalism under which institutions at one level of 
government are similar in their essentials to those one level up. There 
are, of course, strong similarities between state and federal agencies on 
the one hand and (perhaps somewhat less so) between state and local 
governments with respect to the governments “above” them. But this 
analysis demonstrates that this goes only so far. The dominance of such 
                                                                                                                     
 75 A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 543, 595; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
841, 857–58 (2014). 
 76 MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12 (2d ed. 
1998). 
 77 FRUG ET AL., supra note 26, at 149. 
 78 Barron, supra note 14, at 2306–07. 
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fractal thinking has suppressed the close resemblance between local 
governments and state agencies. That analogy has no federal parallel. 
State governments are not at all like federal agencies. True, each 
specializes. But state governments are not exercising a portion of 
federal power with respect to their (geographic) specialty the way that 
agencies do with respect to their substantive ones.  
Rather, as everyone knows, state governments are the original 
sovereigns of American government. They have general jurisdiction and 
broad police powers. The federal government cannot redefine the 
existence, borders, or scope of power enjoyed by the states. It cannot 
redesign or commandeer them.79 When federal authorities seek state 
cooperation, they cannot, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, treat 
states as “agents” of the nation.80 
IV. CROSS-POLLINATING ACROSS DOMAINS 
The previous Part argues that the conventional boundaries between 
local government law and state administrative law lead the former to 
focus upon sovereignty and the latter upon fairness, accountability, and 
expertise. It then shows that local governments and state agencies are 
more similar and less discrete than commonly understood, and that 
these categories blur precisely on the dimensions of sovereignty, 
fairness, accountability, and expertise. Therefore, I argue in this Part, it 
is sensible for both fields, while maintaining their traditional concerns, 
also to look for opportunities to take advantage of categories and 
techniques developed in the other field.  
This Part catalogs several problems in administrative law and local 
government law that the agency–locality analogy helps to address, 
offering solutions not available to those in thrall to the federal 
administrative-law and federalism analogies. These approaches could 
provide a more effective and less derivative state administrative law, 
and a more robust sense of the potentialities of local government. 
A. Judicial Review 
When an aggrieved party argues that a local government or state 
agency lacks authority to act as it has, the reviewing state court must 
adjudicate the scope of the relevant delegation. Ordinarily, this requires 
                                                                                                                     
 79 But cf. U.S. CONST. art 4, § 4 (federal duty to guarantee states a “Republican Form 
of Government”). 
 80 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
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courts to construe the statute that delegates power to locality or agency. 
Courts, however, do not undertake that task in the same way across the 
two types of institutions. The analogy between localities and agencies 
suggests that these processes would benefit were methods of judicial 
review in such cases to converge. In particular, judicial review of 
challenges to local government authority would benefit from being 
conducted more like review of administrative authority. 
Setting aside the important category of jurisdictions with home rule, 
state courts reviewing the extent of local powers generally apply the 
principle known as “Dillon’s Rule.”81 The Rule insists that state grants 
of power to localities either be explicitly stated or necessarily implied. 
“[R]easonable doubt concerning the existence of [local] power is 
resolved by the courts against” the locality.82 Any power not clearly 
granted to a locality is retained by the state. Under this principle, 
delegations that are ambiguous or vague are given no force. Courts act 
to limit local government by construing delegations narrowly.83 
This is not at all the approach taken when a plaintiff argues that a 
state agency has acted in excess of the powers granted by an authorizing 
statute. Indeed, in a plurality of states, reviewing courts defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous terms in its authorizing statute. 
This approach, a sister or cousin to the federal practice of judicial 
deference to administrative interpretation laid out in Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.84—whether it is sister 
or cousin depends upon the state and the context85—is the polar 
opposite of the strict construction demanded by Dillon’s Rule. Chevron-
style deference treats ambiguity as a signal of a legislative decision to 
delegate authority,86 whereas Dillon’s Rule treats ambiguity as 
indicating a legislative decision to retain authority. 
Many states do not engage in Chevron-style deference when 
reviewing agency interpretations of their delegated powers. Some states 
                                                                                                                     
 81 See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1507, 1546–47. But see David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement 
Smart Growth Programs: Dillon’s Rule, Legislative Reform, and the Current State of 
Affairs in North Carolina, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 699 (2000) (The “North Carolina 
courts have generally recognized, albeit belatedly and inconsistently at times, that Dillon’s 
Rule no longer applies,” although local governments in the state do not enjoy home rule). 
 82 JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101–02 
(1872).  
 83 See Schleicher, supra note 81, at 1548. 
 84 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 85 Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 555, 558–60 (2014). 
 86 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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abjure deference entirely, and others limit its applicability or 
aggressiveness.87 Moreover, as Jim Rossi has shown, state courts have 
been substantially more willing than their federal counterparts to insist 
that delegations of power to agencies include definable limitations upon 
agency power, and to void delegations that they consider too vague or 
expansive.88 This version of the nondelegation doctrine is much more 
robust than the weak nondelegation doctrine of the federal courts.89 
Moreover, it echoes Dillon’s Rule in its insistence that delegations to 
agencies will not be honored unless they are coherent and specific.  
Nevertheless, state courts’ review of delegated agency powers is 
much friendlier to delegation than their review of delegated local 
powers. There is no rule of strict construction or a presumption of 
nondelegation for agencies. For most administrative lawyers, even those 
who recognize that Chevron has been received and incorporated by the 
states only partially and spottily, such rules would seem anachronistic 
and at odds with the basic impulse to delegate, which is to take 
advantage of specialization. To local government lawyers, however, 
Dillon’s Rule seems natural. 
There is little constitutional basis for this difference in treatment. To 
the extent that the separation of powers established by state 
constitutions impede the delegation of power by the state legislature and 
general executive to other constitutional organs of government, the two 
cases raise similar concerns.90 Nor is there any reason to expect a 
                                                                                                                     
 87 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 
1258–61 (4th ed. 2007) (“Note on Deference to Agencies in the State Courts”); William R. 
Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017, 
1020–30 (2006); Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA and the Scope of Judicial Review: 
Importing Chevron into State Administrative Law, 20 WIDENER L.J. 801, 818–22 (2011); 
Ann Graham, Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts Give to State Agency 
Interpretation?, 68 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1109–19 (2008); Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping 
in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the 
Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 980–1007, 1010–24 (2008); Saiger, supra 
note 85, at 558–60. 
 88 Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and 
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 562 (2001) [hereinafter Rossi, Overcoming 
Parochialism]; Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191–1201 (1999). 
 89 Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism, supra note 88, at 560. 
 90 Indeed, it is ironic that many states have adopted a more robust nondelegation 
doctrine than the federal government, given that the separation of powers problem that 
gives rise to the doctrine is more attenuated in the states than at the federal level. This is 
not only because state agencies are more robustly integrated into state constitutions than 
federal agencies are into the United States Constitution, but because so many state 
constitutions provide for a plural executive whose power is exercised partly through 
agencies, which is not the case at all at the federal level. Berry & Gersen, supra note 32, at 
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systematic difference in the proclivity to exceed powers properly 
delegated as between state agencies and local governments. For both, 
the temptation to do so will be ubiquitous, sometimes motivated by 
high-minded concerns related to the public good, and sometimes by 
self-serving desires to increase one’s power and externalize costs onto 
outsiders. 
Rather, the practice of narrower construction of local government 
power than of agency power is most straightforwardly explained as a 
consequence of the type of review faced by government action once that 
action is conceded to be within the scope of a delegation. For local 
governments, such review proceeds on the ultra-deferential standard of 
rational basis review.91 If a locality acts within its sphere of authority, it 
need not justify its decisions beyond the barest requirement of minimal 
rationality. Administrative action, on the other hand, is reviewed under 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of the state administrative 
procedure acts. This sort of review is also for rationality, but, as 
developed by the courts, is much more demanding than rational-basis 
review. It requires agencies to demonstrate a connection between ends 
and means and to consider consequences and alternatives. 
Consciousness that this kind of review is available at the back end 
cannot but invite a relatively more liberal or even deferential attitude 
towards the delegation of power to agencies at the front end. As Richard 
Murphy observes relative to federal review of agency action for 
reasonableness, “far more judicial energy goes into policing the manner 
in which agencies exercise their discretion than its permissible scope.”92 
Similarly, the unavailability of anything more rigorous than rational-
basis review with respect to local action encourages narrow reviews of 
local delegations. Judicial construction of local power is less deferential 
than construction of agency power precisely because review of agency 
action within the scope of the delegation is less deferential than the 
review of local power within the scope. 
Preemption also fits nicely into this structure. Localities are not 
allowed to legislate in areas that have been preempted by state 
legislation, whether by explicit legislative statement, an inconsistent 
state demand or requirement (“obstacle” or “impossibility” preemption), 
or a judicial determination that a state statute implies a legislative 
                                                                                                                     
1399–1401. For an overview of nonunitary executives in the states, see Rossi, Overcoming 
Parochialism, supra note 88, at 557–59. 
 91 See, e.g., Town of N. Hempstead v. Exxon Corp., 421 N.E.2d 834, 834 (N.Y. 
1981); Toledo v. Tellings, 871 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (Ohio 2007). 
 92 Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control over the “Hard-Look,” 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2004). 
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intention to control the entirety of a particular regulatory endeavor 
(“field” preemption).93 Preemption, like Dillon’s Rule, offers courts a 
way to reject local action as being in excess of local power before 
arriving at hyper-deferential rational-basis review. Thinking of 
preemption analysis as an (imperfect) functional substitute for review 
on the merits helps to explain why it can seem idiosyncratic and 
unpredictable.94 
The similarities of state agencies and localities suggest that it is 
neither necessary nor wise to confine judicial review entirely to the 
question of power. Doing so tempts courts to curtail the scope of local 
power when their real objection to local action is that they are 
unreasonable. Rational basis review of local action in this way 
unnecessarily reinforces a regime of “city powerlessness.”95 A 
conscientious arbitrary-and-capricious doctrine like that used to review 
agency action, perhaps given a particularly deferential coloration, would 
avoid this problem. The availability of such review would allow judicial 
analysis of the scope of particular delegations and of preemption 
genuinely to address those issues, making analysis of such questions 
less idiosyncratic. Judges could reject local actions (again laying home 
rule aside) because they were unreasonable, because they failed to 
consider important alternatives, or because they unjustifiably created 
externalities to be borne by those outside of the local jurisdiction. 
Such a proposal seems counterintuitive, even radical: it seems to be 
a way to give state judges veto power over a local demos that is 
supposed to be sovereign in its sphere. But this objection is ill-founded, 
for at least five reasons. One, especially given the ubiquity of judicial 
election at the state level, is that judges face political checks. The 
countermajoritarian difficulty that comes immediately to the mind of 
lawyers weaned on federal law does not apply with nearly the same 
force in the state context. State court judges are officials of the 
sovereign that has delegated power to localities.  
Second, local sovereignty is limited. Localities exercise delegated 
state power and therefore ought to be expected to do so rationally, just 
as agencies are. 
Third, state agencies are also sometimes supposed to be 
representative, with leadership often popularly elected. Such agencies 
                                                                                                                     
 93 See, e.g., Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals of Vill. of Saddle Rock, 795 N.E.2d 619, 622 
(N.Y. 2003); Diller, supra note 16, at 1115–16. 
 94 See Diller, supra note 16, at 1116. 
 95 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062–67 
(1980). 
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are able simultaneously to represent constituents and to operate in the 
shadow of this kind of judicial review.  
Fourth, judicial review for reasonableness is already entrenched 
with respect to a preeminent local power.96 That power is zoning.97 The 
judicial convention is to regard zoning decisions as quasi-adjudicative, 
and therefore meriting such review. Regardless of labels, however, the 
effect of this doctrine is to subject the exercise of a preeminent local 
power to review for reasonableness, not just rational basis. 
Finally, arbitrary-and-capricious review is far from veto power. 
Even “hard look” review at its most demanding remains an inquiry only 
into reasonableness, not desirability or wisdom.98 Courts, used to this 
distinction from reviewing agency action, should have no problem 
upholding local actions with which they disagree. 
A nice side effect of such a regime, moreover, would be to nudge 
the practice of local decision-making away from purely political horse 
trading and in the direction of reason-giving and the careful 
consideration and weighing of alternatives. The ability to demonstrate 
that these had occurred would protect a locality against adverse judicial 
review. Administrative law is prepared to accept evidence of rationality 
from wherever it comes, demanding no formal record. Rather, the 
political quasi-record created by the local decision-making process as it 
exists would be expected to demonstrate consideration and 
nonarbitrariness. Although such demands would raise concerns about 
sovereignty if applied to the federal or state legislative process, they 
seem entirely appropriate for localities, where sovereignty is absent and 
where institutional design otherwise strongly encourages the pursuit of 
parochial ends.  
                                                                                                                     
 96 See Barron, supra note 14, at 2318 (“[T]he zoning power [is] now regarded as the 
essence of the home rule that cities and suburbs possess . . . .”). 
 97 See Richard K. Norton, Who Decides, How, and Why? Planning for the Judicial 
Review of Local Legislative Zoning Decisions, 43 URB. LAW. 1085, 1087 (2011); see also 
T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 811 (2015) (holding that the 
requirement of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that “[a]ny decision by a State or local 
government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify 
personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence 
contained in a written record” requires the decision-maker to explain its reasons (alteration 
in original) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii))); id. at 822 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(notwithstanding being in dissent, agreeing that the Act imposes a standard of review 
“familiar” from administrative law by which a reviewing court must be able to determine 
the reasons for a denial).  
 98 See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. 
L. REV. 721, 722–23 (2014). 
448 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
B. Extraterritoriality 
Extraterritoriality is a central preoccupation for scholars of local 
government law. Local government activities necessarily impact, 
whether directly or indirectly, many people outside of local borders; but 
the local franchise applies, with rare exceptions, only to residents.99 The 
mismatch between who decides and who is affected is often deeply 
troubling, both because it encourages the externalization of costs and 
because the mismatch often reflects yawning inequalities based upon 
race and class. These concerns have led to a host of proposals 
advocating consolidation, regionalism, and creative variations on the 
local franchise.100 
Administrative law has underappreciated potential to mitigate such 
problems. Review of local action for reasonableness, advocated in the 
previous section, would help on its own. It would put courts in a 
position to reject local action that constitutes an unjustifiable 
externalization of costs upon others. 
Another reform that could mitigate problems of extraterritoriality 
would be to import notice-and-comment procedures into local 
government from administrative law. The federal Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act both 
provide that comments on proposed rules can be made by any 
“person.”101 The “franchise” for commenting thus has no territorial 
restrictions. Anyone, anywhere, has the right to comment.102 And these 
comments cannot be ignored. Both the federal and the model state 
statute require agencies to “consider” all comments.103 
Specifying a proposal to introduce notice and comment into local 
deliberations must await future study; and any such plan would 
undoubtedly raise serious problems. Moreover, this sort of voice is 
fairly attenuated. The right to have one’s view considered falls short of 
having a vote that can affect how that consideration proceeds or who 
does the considering. Nevertheless, the experience of American 
                                                                                                                     
 99 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1978). 
 100 See FRUG, supra note 12, at 101; Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A 
Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1188 (1996). 
 101 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“interested persons”); 2010 MSAPA, supra note 21, 
§ 306(a) (“a person”).  
 102 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 4:33 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“Informal rulemaking . . . is open to any ‘interested person,’ a term which theoretically 
and in practice has no limiting effect. Literally anybody interested in a rulemaking can 
participate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); 2010 MSAPA, supra note 21, § 306(a). 
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administrative law demonstrates that a naked participation right, along 
with a duty to respond, is not trivial. Administrative law thus offers a 
proven model for meaningful, if limited, participation of nonresidents in 
local affairs. Given the lack of political viability associated with more 
ambitious reforms, this step is worthy of consideration. 
C. Considering Popular Opinion 
Federal administrative law, deeply influenced by Progressive and 
New Deal values, reflects a deep commitment to technocratic 
expertise.104 A major strain in administrative law therefore 
conceptualizes administrative decisions, not just adjudicative 
proceedings but also rulemakings, as properly founded upon the weight 
of good argument rather than the level of political or popular support a 
decision might command.105 Politics are supposed to determine the 
content of the statute that gives an agency authority but not the content 
of agency action under that statute.106 As Kathryn Watts writes, a 
“blanket rejection of politics in administrative decisionmaking has been 
casually accepted as the status quo by courts, agencies, and scholars 
alike.”107 
On this view, there has been considerable discomfort, to put it 
mildly, with allowing administrative decisions to take account of the 
weight of popular or political preference, as opposed to the wisdom of 
arguments that are presented to the agency.108 Most scholars and 
practitioners today would easily grant that federal agencies are entitled, 
insofar as doing so is consistent with their authorizing statutes, to 
advance the political agendas of the current Congress or the sitting 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See Bressman, supra note 17, at 1759–60; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking 
Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 415–16, 426 (2005). 
 105 See Bressman, supra note 17, at 1759–60; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. 
Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
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requires reason-giving”); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy 
Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1724 (2012). 
 106 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and 
Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 906–07 (2006). 
 107 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2009). Watts, in the federal context, is thinking of presidential 
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 108 See Benjamin, supra note 106, at 905 & n.29; Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in 
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1815 
(2012). 
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president, which of course reflect public opinion.109 Nevertheless, many 
remain chary of permitting agencies directly to take into account the 
weight of public or interest-group opinion. In what has become an 
iconic example, this view holds that public fondness for some and 
indifference to other endangered species should not affect policy 
towards those species.110 Other scholars, however, have urged to the 
contrary that the weight of public opinion should be relevant to 
rulemaking, not just because the public’s normative preferences are 
sometimes legally relevant,111 but also because consideration of public 
opinion is an aspect of democratic accountability, especially regarding 
the quasi-legislative rulemaking process.112  
The inclusion of state and local governments as stakeholders in 
federal administrative decision-making processes poses a particular 
version of this quandary. Administrative agencies are supposed to 
consider the views of private membership groups or other entities based 
on the content of those views, not the size of their membership lists. A 
comment from an individual environmentalist should be treated 
identically to an identical comment from the Sierra Club.113 But 
governmental actors are different. They derive whatever authority and 
persuasiveness they might exert in the administrative process precisely 
because they are representative; that is, their authority rests on their 
selection on the basis of popular opinion. The view of the State of Ohio 
is relevant not just because of its technocratic merits but because it is (in 
a sense) the opinion of the people of Ohio. Ohio and its sister states are 
sovereign and therefore definitionally public-regarding, unlike private 
special interest groups. On the other hand, Ohio clearly does not 
                                                                                                                     
 109 See Bressman, supra note 17, at 1751; Sheila Jasanoff, The Practices of Objectivity 
in Regulatory Science, in SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 307, 327 (Charles Camic et 
al. eds., 2012); cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is 
readily apparent that the responsible members of one administration may consider public 
resistance and uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous 
administration.”). 
 110 See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1345, 1361 (2011); Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in 
Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 18–23 (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2662504 [https://perma.cc/3DXV-BP2P]; Stuart W. Shulman, The Case Against 
Mass E-Mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal 
Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 25 (2009). 
 111 See Cuéllar, supra note 104, at 460; Mendelson, supra note 110, at 1362. 
 112 See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 1372–73. 
 113 But cf. Seifter, supra note 110, at 48–49 (arguing that the internal structure of 
membership organizations should lead agencies sometimes to treat their comments 
differently from those of individuals). 
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represent the interests of the United States as a whole, but a narrower 
interest. As an entity with particularistic goals, it is very much like other 
special interest groups. 
Delineating the proper role for the weight of public opinion and of 
the opinion of subnational governments is, in my view, a difficult 
question in federal administrative law. Here, I wish only to say that 
these issues are not nearly as difficult for state administrative law. At 
the state level, it is difficult to argue that agencies whose heads are 
elected cannot or should not reflect popular opinion.114 Localities, 
moreover, can be conceptualized as specialist entities that operate on the 
theory that political opinion among those most affected by their 
regulation is the best available source of expertise regarding that 
regulation. The citizens of Columbus are, on this view, the community 
of “experts” relative to Columbus policy.115 State agencies should 
embrace localities’ self-understanding with respect to this issue, and 
make the weight of popular opinion relevant to their conclusions.  
Similarly, the participation of localities as stakeholders in agency 
decision making at the state level should be understood no differently 
than any kind of inter-agency deliberation or cooperation.116 Localities’ 
overtly political nature poses no conceptual or legal obstacle to state 
agencies weighing their views not only substantively but qua views that 
emerge from a republican political process. 
D. The Multiplication of Intermediate Institutional Forms 
When a state wishes to design an institution in order to deal with a 
specialized policy domain that has a geographic dimension, it too often 
seems to feel constrained either to establish a local government, which 
would be subject to local government law, or a state agency, which 
would be subject to state administrative law. This binary is not 
                                                                                                                     
 114 One might then conclude that appointed state agencies should not rely upon popular 
opinion, because the state legislature chose a form other than elections in constituting them. 
The better conclusion, however, is that states should have a single administrative-law 
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necessary given how blurry the line is between the two categories. 
States may, and often should, select elements from both structures and 
both legal regimes in an effort best to meet the needs of the moment. 
Two examples illustrate this phenomenon. The most studied is 
probably the decision to establish special districts, which, as discussed 
above, are precisely the kind of hybrid form that I urge here.117 Nadav 
Shoked views the proliferation of the special district form, especially 
with regard to issues traditionally assigned to localities, as “troubling to 
those concerned with democracy, efficient local government, and 
equality.”118 Shoked is troubled precisely because the special district is 
exempt from some equality guarantees associated with the law of 
general local governments.119 He argues that once a special district is 
given the power “to regulate behavior or land uses beyond what is 
necessary to maintain the services or infrastructure,” it is “not a special 
district at all.”120 “Local government law should look beyond the formal 
label attached to an entity and treat it as its actual powers command,” he 
says.121 A special district with general regulatory power is a “quasi-
city,” a city in terms of its powers.122 Therefore, it should face the rules 
associated with cities. For Shoked, the most important such rules are 
those that ensure self-determination through a universal local 
franchise.123 
This argument has force to the extent that, as Shoked does, one 
identifies “community self-determination” as the “overriding value.”124 
But why must states elevate self-determination, much less local self-
determination, above other goods in any given case? Even if there are 
no externalities involved, a state may prefer agency-like structures in 
order to advance deliberativeness, efficiency, effectiveness, or 
depoliticization. It is hard to see why one should be more concerned in 
principle about, say, a local water district, where there is neither 
franchise nor representativeness, than one is concerned with the clean-
water policy of a local region of a state agency for environmental 
protection.125 An administrative region, like a special district, is in no 
                                                                                                                     
 117 See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 118 Shoked, supra note 68, at 1974. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 2000. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1988–89, 2002. 
 124 Shoked, supra note 68, at 1975. 
 125 See Sara Singleton, Collaborative Environmental Planning in the American West: 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 11 ENVTL. POL. 54, 59–68 (2002) (examples of 
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way formally representative even as it tailors its work to the needs of, 
and negotiates its policy directives with, local stakeholders.126 If local 
land use were handled by an agency through rulemaking or adjudicatory 
procedures, there would be no voting; but the agency’s work would 
proceed with more publicity and participation than ordinarily associated 
with special government. If Shoked would accept the validity of such 
policies when enacted by a local environmental or land-use agency—
and he says nothing to suggest he would not—then his objections to the 
special district are hard to understand. 
Conceptualizing local government as a variety of state agency 
makes Shoked’s problem less troubling.127 Shoked’s claim is that the 
permissibility of governing an area’s land use under procedures other 
than those associated with general local government must be assessed 
under the criterion of self-determination. To an administrative lawyer, 
the question is what procedures best fit the administration of land use in 
a given area. Self-determination matters, but so might the density of the 
jurisdiction, the character of its land, the nature of possible spillovers 
from its decisions, and its place in the state’s economy and 
environment. If one sees local government itself as a choice of agency 
form, rather than seeing the only alternative as ordinary or “quasi” local 
government, one may find that one moves away from single-criterion 
judgments in favor of a more multivalent, variable, and idiosyncratic 
approach to land use. There is no reason to confine available 
institutional designs to a binary numerus clausus of special and general 
government. 
Similar modes of thinking about what local government has to be 
have characterized efforts to create regional governance structures. The 
ability and incentive of multiple, competing local governments to 
benefit their local constituencies while externalizing costs onto other 
residents of the metropolis is, as I have noted, perhaps the single 
greatest problem associated with American local government.128 
                                                                                                                     
 126 See Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Determining an Agency’s Regulatory 
Style: How Does the EPA Water Office Enforce the Law?, 45 W. POL. Q. 403, 407, 409–10 
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 127 Indeed Shoked himself makes the striking observations that when cities themselves 
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Interlocal competition exacerbates income inequality, social 
stratification, and racial segregation. Especially, but not exclusively, for 
those concerned about equity issues, metropolitan or regional 
government has seemed necessary. 
Note that the felt necessity seems to be for regional or metropolitan 
government. General-purpose, metropolitan government, with 
metropolitan boundaries and a metropolitan franchise, is seen by many 
as the ideal solution.129 However, even these advocates recognize—
along with nearly everyone else who has examined the problem—that 
massive metropolitan consolidation of existing localities is a political 
impossibility in the United States today.130 In practice, a second-best 
way to move towards regionalization has been to create special district 
for particular services, like sewage or transportation, with metropolitan 
jurisdiction. This is often done.131 But special districts are deeply siloed, 
and (with a few prominent exceptions) not politically salient. They are 
therefore prone to capture. 
Remarkably, other major proposals to ameliorate the costs of 
interjurisdictional competition largely focus upon institutional design 
elements peculiar to local governments. Prominent advocates of 
regionalism and metropolitanism seem to assume that, given a problem 
involving the scale of local government, the solution must perforce 
involve right-scaling those governments. Frug, for example, describes 
the problem as one of how to design a “democratically organized 
regional institution.”132 Such an entity would have “to be organized 
according to the one-person, one-vote principle.”133 Frug and others 
thus focus upon ways to reform and expand the local franchise.134 
Others focus upon boundary reform.135 Still others emphasize ways to 
                                                                                                                     
 129 Briffault, supra note 128, at 1165–67 (1996). 
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induce interlocal cooperation.136 When such proposals pay particular 
attention to the management of stakeholder politics and processes of 
consultation, they fall under the rubric known as the “New 
Regionalism.”137 All of these approaches address the problem of 
interjurisdictional competition through the basic institutions that 
constitute the toolbox of the local-government lawyer. 
This is a debate over comparative institutional design; and the 
argument of this Article suggests that those designers would benefit 
were they to raid the toolbox of administrative law. Addressing the 
scale of local governments need not involve only attention to scale; it 
can also involve attention to what makes a local government. A regional 
agency, empowered to regulate not in a substantive area but in a 
geographical one, is an underexplored template.138 Such an institution, 
in which administrators are given responsibilities in multiple 
interconnected policy areas as they impact a particular region, has much 
more flexibility than the ordinary special district. Agencies are familiar 
with ways, both standard and bespoke, to handle stakeholder politics 
and consultation. State agencies in particular, unlike federal ones, are 
also well adapted to being melded with institutions of popular 
democracy, including elections. In these respects, a regional 
policymaking agency would avoid the flaws associated with the special 
district or multijurisdictional commission.  
At the same time, however, an agency would bring a level of 
hierarchical control and deliberativeness to problems that can be 
undermined by an excess of democratic or popular control. Local 
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1164 (“Voluntary interlocal cooperation is not an adequate solution.”). 
 137 See Stephen M. Wheeler, The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an 
Emerging Movement, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 267, 275–76 (2002). 
 138 See also DOIG, supra note 136, at 22–23 (noting agency-like characteristics at the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey); cf. Barron, supra note 14, at 2306–08 
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that would inform local decision-making, enhance its legitimacy, and protect it from 
“political taint.” Id. 
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governments are bottom-up and rawly political. New-regionalist 
proposals, by contrast, seem to anticipate regional policymaking that 
would be popular but not at all political. Such paradigms emphasize 
collaboration, coordination, and activism as ways to defuse deep-seated 
conflicts of interest in ways that can seem naïve or even utopian.139 
Agencies split the difference. They are reassuringly old-fashioned in 
their structure: They make sure everyone has their say, they secure a 
place for stakeholders and for the exchange of opinions, but they also 
define a place where the buck ultimately stops and a decision can be 
made.140 
This Article is of course not the place to present a full-blown 
proposal for agencies of regional government. But it does urge 
participants in the regionalism debate to think about how such proposals 
might advance the conversation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It is time that we recognize that local government law and state 
administrative law overlap and that they should overlap more than they 
do. It is both fair and helpful to think of localities and state agencies as 
two varieties of response to the same basic problem. The locality puts 
politics front and center: as a political subdivision it requires law that is 
attentive to its political nature. The agency puts deliberation first; it 
requires law that is responsive to its distance from politics. But 
localities could benefit from deliberation on the administrative model, 
and state agencies, which (unlike federal agencies) already substantially 
respond to popular opinion, plausibly and in many contexts should do 
so even more. There is no reason, constitutional or otherwise, that a 
state, when designing a specialist institution, should have to choose 
between boxes labeled “local government” and “agency.” It can and 
should partake of the virtues of both. 
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